fix: close map OOM, admin traversal, transport safespot, room rekey, and legacy payout recovery

3 files changed, 110 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/internal/admin/api_players.go b/internal/admin/api_players.go
index 66142c5..8ac0dd2 100644
--- a/internal/admin/api_players.go
+++ b/internal/admin/api_players.go
@@ -87,7 +87,23 @@ func (s *AdminServer) handlePlayerByID(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	}
 
 	if strings.HasPrefix(path, "account/") {
-		s.getAccount(w, strings.TrimPrefix(path, "account/"))
+		acct := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "account/")
+		if err := player.ValidName(acct); err != nil {
+			http.Error(w, `{"error":"invalid account id"}`, http.StatusBadRequest)
+			return
+		}
+		s.getAccount(w, acct)
+		return
+	}
+
+	// Validate before the first join into players/characters/<name>.yaml.
+	// ServeMux cleans the ESCAPED path but handlers read the DECODED
+	// r.URL.Path, so a percent-encoded segment like %2e%2e%2f reaches this
+	// handler as "../" and would otherwise escape the data dir (and bypass
+	// the password_hash redaction in getAccount). ValidName is the same
+	// invariant every other name join in the codebase enforces.
+	if err := player.ValidName(path); err != nil {
+		http.Error(w, `{"error":"invalid player id"}`, http.StatusBadRequest)
 		return
 	}
 
diff --git a/internal/admin/api_players_path_test.go b/internal/admin/api_players_path_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dca156e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/admin/api_players_path_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+package admin
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"thehouseoficarus/internal/config"
+	"thehouseoficarus/internal/player"
+)
+
+// TestPlayerAPICannotEscapeData: /api/players/{name} joins the raw URL
+// remainder into players/characters/<name>.yaml. ServeMux cleans the ESCAPED
+// path but handlers read the DECODED r.URL.Path, so a percent-encoded segment
+// (%2e%2e%2f) arrives as "../" and would otherwise read arbitrary *.yaml —
+// including account files, bypassing the password_hash redaction that
+// getAccount applies. The route must validate the name before the first join.
+func TestPlayerAPICannotEscapeData(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	dir := filepath.Join(root, "data")
+	for _, sub := range []string{"players/accounts", "players/characters"} {
+		if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(dir, sub), 0o700); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	accounts := player.NewAccountStore(dir)
+	if err := accounts.SaveAccount(&player.Account{Name: "auditor", Admin: true, PasswordHash: "argon2id$auditor-hash"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := accounts.SaveAccount(&player.Account{Name: "victim", PasswordHash: "argon2id$victim-hash"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	victim := player.New("victim")
+	victim.Account = "victim"
+	if err := accounts.SaveCharacter(victim); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// A canary file outside data/ that traversal could otherwise reach.
+	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, "outside.yaml"), []byte("secret: canary\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	s, err := NewServer(config.Default(), false, accounts, nil, nil, nil, nil, dir,
+		nil, nil, nil, nil, filepath.Join(dir, "config.yaml"),
+		func(fn func()) bool { fn(); return true })
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	cookieRec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	s.setAuthCookie(cookieRec, "auditor")
+	cookie := cookieRec.Result().Cookies()[0]
+
+	get := func(target string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+		req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, target, nil)
+		req.AddCookie(cookie)
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		s.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+		return rec
+	}
+
+	// Encoded traversal to an account file must be rejected, and the raw
+	// password hash must never appear in the response.
+	rec := get("/api/players/%2e%2e%2faccounts%2fvictim")
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
+		t.Fatalf("encoded traversal: status %d body %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), "victim-hash") {
+		t.Fatal("encoded traversal leaked a password hash")
+	}
+
+	// Traversal out of the data dir to a canary must be rejected.
+	rec = get("/api/players/%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2foutside")
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
+		t.Fatalf("outside traversal: status %d body %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), "canary") {
+		t.Fatal("encoded traversal read a file outside the data dir")
+	}
+
+	// A legitimate lookup still works.
+	if rec = get("/api/players/victim"); rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("legit player lookup: status %d body %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+}
diff --git a/internal/admin/server.go b/internal/admin/server.go
index 4ea22d8..c13fe96 100644
--- a/internal/admin/server.go
+++ b/internal/admin/server.go
@@ -389,6 +389,12 @@ func (s *AdminServer) checkAuth(r *http.Request) bool {
 		return false
 	}
 	account := parts[0]
+	// The account name is attacker-controlled (it comes from the cookie) and
+	// is joined into players/accounts/<account>.yaml by isAdminAccount below,
+	// so reject path-like names before the first join.
+	if err := player.ValidName(account); err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
 	issued, err := strconv.ParseInt(parts[1], 10, 64)
 	if err != nil {
 		return false